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Splintered Decisions, Implicit Reversals
and Lower Federal Courts:
Planned Parenthood v. Casey

Planned Parenthood v. Casey' is ostensibly just another in
a long line of abortion cases winding its way up to the Supreme
Court. However, the Third Circuit's analysis of the issues in
Casey provides an important illustration of some diff"1cult
jurisprudential problems faced by lower federal courts when
the Supreme Court has not clearly stated "what the law is."2
The Constitution provides that "[tlhe judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and i n
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and e~tablish."~
The judicial system which Congress has
created pursuant to Article I11 requires inferior or lower federal
courts to abide by the decisions of the Supreme Court?
When a lower federal court is presented with a case raising
a question of law that the Supreme Court has previously
decided, its role is limited to applying the Court's precedent to
the facts of that case. However, the dual fundion of a Supreme
Court decision-resolving
particular cases and providing
1. 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W.3498 (US.Jan. 21,
1992) (NO. 91-902).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). Justice Marshall's
2.
statement, "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is," id., was used to justify judicial review of legislative ads.
However, it seems reasonable to suggest that implicit within the duty to "say what
the law iswis the duty to do so clearly. The difficulty faced by the Casey court is
that the latest Supreme Court abortion decisions have created a great deal of
uncertainty about "what the law is." See infra text accompanying notes 26-37.
3.
U.S. CONST.art. 111, 9 1.
4.
"[Ulnless we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a
precedent of [the Supreme] Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no
matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be." Hutto v.
Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (per curiam). "As a lower court, we are bound
both by the Supreme Court's choice of legal standard or test and by the result it
reaches under that standard or test." Casey, 947 F.2d at 691-92.
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guidance for fbture decisions5-complicates the task of
determining the precedential value of a particular decision
when: (1) the majority does not agree on a single supporting
rationale for its decision-a splintered decision; or (2) the
majority's rationale for a particular result undermines the
rationale supporting the result of a previous case without
explicitly overturning it-an
implicit reversal. These
complications are especially significant in light of expectations
that the Supreme Court's new ideological make-up will create a
period of transition, as the Court reshapes many areas of the
law in a more conservative image?
Casey is an example of how lower federal courts might
untangle a limited number of these complications. In Casey, the
Third Circuit upheld the constitutionality of various sections of
Pennsylvania's abortion statute, reasoning that Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services,' a splintered decision, implicitly
overturned parts of Roe v. Wade.'
To lay the necessary groundwork for a discussion of Casey's
implications, this note briefly reviews relevant portions of the
Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence and outlines the Third
Circuit's reasoning in Casey. The note then analyzes the Third

Linda Novak, Note, m e Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality
5.
Decisions, 80 COLUM.L. REV. 756, 757 (1980) (lower federal courts are bound by
both the result and the rationale of a Supreme Court decision).
Compare Marshall Ingwerson, High Court's Slide to the Right, CHRISTIAN
6.
SCI.MONITOR,
Apr. 4, 1991, 5 U.S. at 6 ("The overall drift of the court, to most
court-watchers, is at the least to consolidate the sharp rightward shift that began
at the end of the Reagan presidency.") and Michael P. Ostrye, New Anthem, LA.
TIMES, July 29, 1991, at B4 ("With the Supreme Court on a new shift to the
conservative right, maybe we should change the national anthem to 'Under My
Thumb.' ") with Robert P. Hey, US Supreme Court Opens Term, CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MoN~~oR,
Oct. 1, 1990, § U.S. at 1 ("Court-watchers are awaiting this year's
judicial decisions to learn whether the court will continue its recent trend of
making modest and generally more conservative changes in existing law.").
In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985),
Justice Rehnquist dissented from the Court's broad interpretation of the Commerce
Clause. He noted, "I do not think it incumbent on those of us in dissent to spell
out further the fine points of a principle that will, I am confident, in time again
command the support of a majority of this Court." Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Justice O'Connor agreed: "I share Justice Rehnquist's belief that this
Court will in time again assume its constitutional responsibility." Id. at 589
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Depending on your ideological preferences, these
statements are like either a defiant General MacArthur declaring "I shall return,"
or a nightmarish Freddie Krueger warning "I'll be baaaaack."
7.
492 U.S. 490 (1989).
8.
410 US. 113 (1973).
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Circuit's resolution of the dBcult questions concerning
precedent. Finally, the note concludes that the Third Circuit's
reasoning, though theoretically problematic, is jurisprudentially
correct.
OF THE SUPREME
COURT'S
11. BRIEFSUMMARY
ABORTION
JURISPRUDENCE

In 1973, the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade held
that articles of the Texas Penal Codeg criminalizing abortions
not performed to save the mother's life, violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.10 From a
jurisprudential standpoint, the Court's opinion in Roe is
important for three reasons. First, the Court held that a
woman has a limited fimdamental right to an abortion which is
protected by the right to privacy." Second, the opinion
established that governmental regulation of abortion must be
subjected to strict scrutiny12 to determine if it interferes
unconstitutionally with a woman's abortion decision." Lastly,
Roe developed a trimester framework to provide future
guidance in determining the point a t which a state's legitimate
interests in maternal health and fetal life become compelling."
The regulations at issue in Roe included articles 1191-94 and 1196 of the
9.
Texas Penal Code. Id. at 117. For the text of the relevant articles see id. at 117
n.1.
10. U.S. CONST.amend. XIV, 8 1; Roe, 410 US. at 164.
11. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. "The Constitution does not explicitly mention any
right of privacy. In a line of decisions, however . . . the Court has recognized that
a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy,
does exist under the Constitution." Id. at 152. This right to privacy extends only to
those rights which are considered fundamental. Id. Although the Court determined
that the right to an abortion is fundamental and thus protected by the right to
privacy, it rejected the argument that it was absolute. Id. at 153.
12. Strict scrutiny is the Supreme Court's highest standard of review. See, e.g.,
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2952 (1990) warshall, J., joined by
Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) ( " m e have subjected state laws limiting
[the abortion] right to the most exacting scrutiny . . . ."). Strict scrutiny requires
that a regulation pass the following two-part test: (1) the regulation must be
prompted by a compelling state interest; and (2) the regulation must be the least
restrictive means of promoting the compelling state interest. See Roe, 410 U.S. at
155.
13. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
14. Id. at 162-65. The state's interest in the health of the mother becomes
compelling at the end of the first trimester, when the health risk of an abortion
becomes equal to that of a normal childbirth. Id at 163. The state's interest in
protecting potential life becomes compelling at the point of viability, approximately
the end of the second trimester, when the fetus is capable of meaningful life
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Since Roe, several Supreme Court cases have invoked strict
scrutiny in reviewing state abortion regulations. Two decisions
are relevant to the present discussion: Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health (Akron I)'' and Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists.l6
In Akron I, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Roe's
determination that any regulation of abortion must be
"reasonably designed"" to further a compelling interest,"
striking down an Akron ordinance requiring a woman's
"informed written consent" prior to performance of an
abortion.'' The Court conceded that an informed consent
requirement could be valid in light of the state's interest in
protecting the health of pregnant women2' but ruled that the
Akron ordinance's requirements for securing informed consent
went beyond the scope of the health interestO2lIn Thornburgh,
outside the mother's womb. Id.
15.
462 U.S. 416 (1983).
16.
476 U.S. 747 (1986).
Akron I, 462 US. at 434. Justice Powell, writing for the Court, used the
17.
phrase "reasonably designed to further that state interest" to describe part two of
the strict scrutiny test. "Reasonably designed" is linguistically similar to
"reasonably related," the terminology used in part two of the rational basis
scrutiny test. See infia note 30. However, the phrase is used in the context of
reaffirming Roe's strict scrutiny requirement. This fact, together with the use of
the word "designed" instead of the word "related," suggests that Justice Powell was
contemplating that the regulation must be subjected to strict scrutiny. Contra infra
note 33.
18.
See Akmn I, 462 U.S. at 434.
19.
AKRON CODIFIEDORDINANCES
$ 1870.06 (1978) specifed certain information
to be provided prior to obtaiaing a written consent for an abortion. For the text of
the ordinance, see Akron I, 462 U.S. at 423-24 n. 5. The Court in Akron I also
struck down other abortion related regulations that are not relevant to this
discussion. See id. at 452.
20.
Akron I, 462 U.S. at 443. The Supreme Court first recognized the
legitimacy of informed consent in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 6566 (1976).
Akron I, 462 U.S. at 443-44.
21.

In other words, Akron's ordinance failed the
second prong of strict scrutiny review. In Thornburgh, Justice Blackrnun explained
why the Akron I informed consent ordinance was overbroad:
The informational requirements in the Akmn ordinance were invalid
for two "equally decisive" reasons. The first was that "much of the
information required is designed not to inform the woman's consent but
rather to persuade her to withhold it altogether." The second was that a
rigid requirement that a specific body of information be given in all cases,
irrespective of the particular needs of the patient, intrudes upon the
discretion of the pregnant woman's physician and thereby imposes the
"undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket" with which the Court in
Danforth was concerned.
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the Supreme Court reaf!firmed the principles laid down in
~ o e " and applied the rationale developed in Akron 1% to
strike down a Pennsylvania informed consent statute? Both
Akron I and Thornburgh are significant because the informed
consent provisions which these decisions struck down are
almost identical to those at issue in C ~ s e y . ~ ~
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services26 signaled a
substantial departure from Roe and its progeny. For the first
time a majority of the Court did not invoke strict scrutiny to
review the challenged regulations. In Webster, Missouri
statutes requiring viability t e s t i g and prohibiting the use of
public funds, employees, or facilities to perform2' or counsel2'
about abortions were upheld, applying ostensibly rational basis
scrutiny.30 A combination of three opinions supported the
Court's result in Webster. Writing for the plurality, Chief
Justice Rehnquist found the regulations constitutional because
they permissibly furthered the state's interests?' Justice

Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762 (citations omitted).
"Again today, we reaffirm the general principles laid down in Roe and in
22.
Akron." Thonburgh, 476 U.S. at 747.
23. Id. at 762. "These two reasons [see supra note 211 apply with equal and
controlling force to the specific and intrusive informational prescriptions of the
Pennsylvania statutes." Id.
Id. at 759-64 (invalidating 18 PA. CONS.STAT.ANN. 8 3205 (1983)).
24.
P l a ~ e dParenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 697 (3d Cir. 1991). Compare
25.
18 PA. CONS. STAT.ANN. 8 3205 (1983) with 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. Q 3205
(Supp. 1991).
26.
492 U.S. 490 (1989).
27. Mo. ANN. STAT. 3 188.029 (Vernon Supp. 1992); see Webster, 492 U.S. a t
513-21 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White & Kennedy, JJ.); id. at 525-31 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. a t 532 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
MO. ANN. STAT. $8 188.210, 188.215 (Vernon Supp. 1992); see Webster, 492
28.
U.S. a t 507-11 (opinion of the Court).
Mo. ANN. STAT. $8 188.205, 188.210 & 188.215 (Vernon Supp. 1992); see
29.
Webster, 492 U.S. at 511-13 (opinion of the Court).
30.
Rational basis scrutiny is the Supreme Court's least restrictive standard of
review. See, e.g., Webster, 492 U.S. a t 543 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Rational
basis scrutiny requires that (1) the state have a legitimate interest; and (2) the
regulation must be reasonably related to the legitimate state interest. Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 173 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955)).
31.
Webster, 492 U.S. at 519-20 (Rehnquist, CJ., joined by White & Kennedy,
JJ.) Justice Rehnquist's language noting that the statute permissibly furthers a
legitimate state interest is equated with rational basis scrutiny. See Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 689 (3d Cir. 1991). Previously, Justice
Rehnquist has advocated rational basis scrutiny in this area. See, e.g., Roe v,
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Scalia concurred in the result but advocated the outright
reversal of Roe.32 Justice O'Comor also concurred in the
result but analyzed the regulations using an "undue burden"
standard of review.33
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 (1973) ("The test traditionally applied in the area of
social and economic legislation is whether or not a law such as that challenged
has a rational relation to a valid state objective.").
Webster, 492 US. at 532 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
32.
the judgment). Justice Scalia does not articulate his standard of review. Instead,
he notes that it has been adequately articulated "in dissents of my colleagues in
other cases." Id. Many of these dissents generally advocate rational basis review.
See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 173 (Rehnquist J., dissenting).
Webster, 492 U.S. at 530 (O'Co~or,J., concurring in part and concurring in
33.
the judgement). According to the Casey murt, Justice 07Connor's formulation of the
undue burden standard requires strict scrutiny if a regulation places an undue
burden on the abortion decision. Casey, 947 F.2d at 713 ("[We hold that 5 3209
[spousal notice] constitutes an undue burden on a woman's abortion decision.
Accordingly we must apply strict scn~tiny. . . ."). If there is no undue burden, the
regulation is subject only to rational basis review. Id. at 689-90.
Although the Casey Court correctly identified Justice O'Connor's undue burden
standard as the narrowest concurrence, see infra part IV.A.4, the court incorrectly
interpreted one-half of the standard. Justice O'Connor does not define the undue
burden standard in either Webster or Hodgson. Reference to her earlier dissents in
Akron I and Thornburgh is necessary to discover its meaning. In Akron I, Justice
O'Connor states that "[tlhe 'undue burden' required in the abortion cases
represents the required threshold inquiry that must be conducted before this Court
can require a State to justify its legislative actions under the exacting 'compelling
state interest' standard." Akron I, 462 U.S. 416, 463 (1983). According to Justice
O'Co~or, a regulation is considered unduly burdensome if it imposes "absolute
obstacles or severe limitations on the abortion decision." Id. at 464. (07Connor, J.,
joined by White & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). Later in her opinion, Justice
O'Connor explains what she means by an "exacting" standard.
The Court has never required that state regulation that burdens the
abortion decision be "narrowly drawn" to express only the relevant state
interest. In Roe . . . the Court never actually adopted this standard . . . .
In its decision today, the Court fully endorses the Roe requirement that a
burdensome health regulation, or . . . "significant obstacle[]" be
"reasonably related" to the state compelling interest.
Id. at 467-68 n. 11 (citation omitted, emphasis added). Two things are clear from
this statement. First, Justice O'Connor's interpretation of Roe does not require
strict scrutiny. Second, Justice O'Connor's "exacting" standard of review requires 1)
a compelling state interest; and 2) a regulation that is reasonably related to that
interest. This is the traditional formulation of exacting or mid-tier scrutiny.
With this in mind, the following is the correct formulation of the undue burden
sttmdard. If a regulation places an undue burden on the abortion decision, the
Court applies exacting or mid-tier scrutiny. If a regulation does not impose an
undue burden, the Court applies rational basis scmtiny. Justice O'Co~or's dissent
in Thonbu?gh confirms this conclusion.
I do, however, remain of the views expressed in my dissent in Akron
. . . . [Hleightened scrutiny [should be] reserved for instances in which
the State has imposed an "undue burden" on the abortion decision. . . .
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In Hodgson v. Minnesota," the Court upheld the
constitutionality of an abortion statute imposing a mandatory
48-hour waiting period and a parental notification requirement
on minors. The statute also provided for judicial bypass of the
~ ~ the decision of the
parental notification r e q ~ i r e m e n t .Again
Court was not supported by any single rationale. Justice
Kennedy determined that parental notification coupled with a
Justice
judicial bypass was constitutionally permi~sible.~~
O'Connor determined that two-parent notification coupled with
a judicial bypass did not unduly burden the abortion right and
was therefore ~onstitutional.~~
111.

THIRD CIRCUIT'SINTERPRETATION
OF THE BINDING
NATUREOF SUPREMECOURTPRECEDENT

A. Procedural History of Casey
Planned Parenthood v. Casey3' was a facial challenge by a
group of health care providers to the constitutionality of several
amendments to the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of
1982.39 After a three day trial, the district court issued an
And if a state law does interfere with the abortion decision to an extent
that is unduly burdensome, so that it becomes "necessary to apply an
exacting standard of review," the possibility remains that the statute will
withstand the strider scrutiny.
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
828 (1986) (O'Comor, J., joined by White & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
110 S. Ct 2926 (1990).
34.
35.
Id. at 2947.
Although Justice Kennedy's opinion does not explicitly state the standard of
36.
review employed, a careful reading of the opinion suggests his analysis is based on
a rational basis review of the regulations. See Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2961-72
(Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ., White and Scalia, JJ., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part). The Casq, court reached a similar
conclusion. Casey, 947 F.2d at 696.
37.
Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2950-51 (O'Co~or, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment in part). According to Justice O'Co~or's articulation of
undue burden review in Akron I, a finding that a regulation does not unduly
burden the abortion right requires the application of rational basis scrutiny to
determine whether the regulation is constitutional. See supra note 33.
38.
744 F. Supp. 1323 (ED.Pa. 1990) rev'd in part, affd in part, 947 F.2d 682
(3d Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3498 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1992) (No. 91-902).
39.
Act of March 25, 1988, No. 31, 55 3-10, 1988 Pa. Laws 262 and Act of Nov.
17, 1989, No. 64, 99 1-9, 1989 Pa. Laws 592 (amending 18 PA. CONS.*AT. ANN.
93 3201-20 (1983)). The State of P e ~ s y l v a n i apassed the 1988 amendments prior
to the Supreme Court's ruling in Webster. Casey, 744 F. Supp at 1325. After issuing a preliminary injunction, the district court stayed further proceedings pending
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opinion holding several sections of the act, including an informed consent requirement, unconstitutional. On appeal, the
Third Circuit reversed, upholding the constitutionality of the
informed consent requirement:'

B. The Third Circuit's Reasoning in Casey.
The Third Circuit began its analysis by noting that, like
Webster, the abortion statutes in question did not conflict with
the holding of Roe because they "involved the regulation of
abortions rather than their outright pr~hibition.'~'The court
then addressed "whether the standard of review of abortion
regulations promulgated by the Court in Roe and in later cases
such as [Akron I and Thornburgh] survived Webster and the
Court's subsequent decision in [Hoclgson]."42
The court recognized three standards used by different
But because the reJustices in reviewing abortion de~isions.'~
sults in Webster and Hodgson were not supported by majorities," the court turned to Marks v. United state^:^ relying
on it for two important propositions: ( 1 ) "a legal standard endorsed by the Court ceases to be the law of the land when a
majority of the Court in a subsequent case declines to apply it,
even if that majority is composed of Justices who disagree on
what the proper standard should be;"46and (2) "the controlling
opinion in a splintered decision is that of the Justice or Justhe outcome of Webster. Id. After the Court's ruling in Webster, the Pennsylvania
legislature passed the 1989 amendments and appellees amended their complaint to
include these amendments. Id.
The Pennsylvania informed consent provision requires the "voluntary and
40.
informed consent of the woman upon whom the abortion is to be performed." PA.
CONS.STAT.ANN. 5 3205 (Supp. 1991). Sections 3206 (parental consent), 3214(a)
(reporting requirements), and 320703) and 32140 (public disclosure of clinic's
reports) were also found constitutional. Casey, 947 F.2d at 687. Section 3209
(spousal notice) was declared unconstitutional. Id.
41.
Casey, 947 F.2d at 687; see also Sojourner v. Roemer, 772 F. Supp. 930
(E.D.La. 1991) (invalidating a criminal prohibition of abortion similar to the Texas
prohibition invalidated in Roe); supra text accompanying note 10.
42.
+ey, 947 F.2d at 687-88 (citations omitted).
43.
Id. at 688-91. The three standards of review according to Casey are: (1)
strict scrutiny, id. at 689; see generally supra note 12; (2) rational basis scrutiny,
Casey, 947 F.2d at 689; see generally supra note 30; and (3) undue burden review,
Casey, 947 F.2d at 689-91; see genenzlly supra note 33.
44.
See supra text accompanying notes 31-33, 36-37.
45.
430 US. 188 (1977). For a brief summary of Marks see infia notes 60-63
and accompanying text.
46.
Casey, 947 F.2d at 693.
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tices who concur on the 'narrowest ground^."^' Applying the
Marks analysis, the court found that a majority of the Justices
had not applied Roe's strict scrutiny test in Webster or
Hodgson. The court also determined that Justice 0%onnor7s
opinion was the opinion concurring in the result on the narrowest groundd8 Accordingly, the court determined that the undue burden analysis had replaced Roe's strid scrutiny analysis
as the proper test for reviewing abortion regulations."
Having decided that Roe's strict scrutiny did not survive
Webster and Hodgson, the second issue the court addressed was
whether it was "required to follow results reached by the Supreme Court in cases prior t o Webster and Hodgson even
though [it was] not bound by the rationale which produced
those results[.]"50 This concerned the court "because the Supreme Court, engaging in strict scrutiny review in Akron I and
Thornburgh, had struck down informed consent provisions almost identical to the provisions at issue" in Casey? The court
determined that the results of Akron I and Thornburgh were
not binding, reasoning that when a "standard [of review] is
replaced, decisions reached under the old standard are not
binding."52Applying undue burden analysis, the Third Circuit
determined that Pennsylvania's informed consent requirements
were con~titutional.~~

IV. ANALYSIS OF THE THIRDCIRCUIT'SINTERPRETATION
AND APPLICATION OF MARKS
According to the Third Circuit, Marks stands for two relevant propositions: (1)a legal standard ceases to be law when a
majority of the court does not apply it;Mand (2) the narrowest
concurring opinion becomes the law when the court issues a
splintered deci~ion.~'This section will analyze Casey's inter47.
Id.
48.
Id. at 694-97.
Id. at 697. The Eighth Circuit has similarly determined that Justice
49.
O'Connor's undue burden standard is binding. Coe v. Melahn, No. 90-1552, slip op.
at 3 (8th Cir. Mar. 2, 1992).
Casey, 947 F.2d at 697.
50.
Id.; see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
51.
52.
Casey, 947 F.2d at 697-98 (footnote omitted).
53.
Id. at 702-04. The court ruled on the constitutionality of other provisions as
well. See supra note 40.
54.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
55.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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pretation and application of these two propositions.

A. Precedential Value of a Splintered Decision

1. History of the narrowest grounds rule
The history of the narrowest concurring opinion or narrowest grounds rule can be traced to Gregg v. Georgia.56 In
this death penalty case, the Court interpreted F u r m n v. Georthat "[slince five Justices wrote separately
g i ~ : determining
~
in support of the judgments in Furman, the holding of the
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members
who concurred i n t h e judgments on t h e narrowest
grounds . . . ."58 Ironically, Gregg itself was a splintered decis i ~ n , ~and
' thus a majority of the Court did not support the
narrowest grounds rule.
This defect was remedied in Marks v. United state^.^' In
Marks, a majority embraced the narrowest grounds rule6' to
explain why the lower court erred in failing to follow the plu-

56.
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
57.
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169 n.15 (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.). Of
58.
the five Justices supporting the result in Furman, Justice B r e ~ a nand Justice
Marshall determined that capital punishment was unconstitutional per se, while
Justice Douglas, Justice Stewart and Justice White determined that the Georgia
statute was unconstitutional without reaching the issue of per se invalidity. The
Gregg plurality concluded that Georgia's revised death penalty statute was constitutional because the defects noted by Justices Stewart and White were corrected
when the statute was revised. Id. at 206-07; see generally Novak, supra note 5, at
761.
Interestingly, Justice White, the author of one of Furman's narrowest grounds
opinions, did not join in the conclusion that the narrowest concurring opinion became the law. Instead he wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment.
59. Justice Stewart a ~ o u n c e dthe judgment of the Court and gave an opinion
joined by Justice Powell and Justice Stevens. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 158. Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist filed a separate statement concurring in the judgment. Id. at 226. Justice White filed an opinion concurring in the judgment joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 207. Justice Blackmun filed
a separate statement concurring in the judgment. Id. at 227. Justice B r e ~ a nfiled
a dissenting opinion. Id. at 227. Justice Marshall also filed a dissenting opinion.
Id. at 231.
60.
430 US. 188 (1977).
61.
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, was joined by Chief Justice Burger,
Justice White, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Rehnquist. Interestingly, Justice
Stewart and Justice Stevens, who both supported the narrowest grounds rule in
Gregg, did not support it in Marks, while Chief Justice Burger, Justice White,
Justice Blackmun, and Justice Rehnquist, who did not support the narrowest
grounds rule in Gregg, supported the rule in Marks.

PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. CASEY
rality opinion in the Fanny Hill case,'j2 which adopted a new
definition of obscenitys3
Since Marks, the narrowest grounds rule has been mentioned in three cases. In Vasquez u. hiller^,^ a case affirming
a lower court's ruling sustaining a petition for habeas corpus,
the Court helped define the limitations of the narrowest
grounds rule. In dissent, Justice Powell argued that the narrowest grounds rule applies to cases in which five Justices who
support the rationale in a case are not the same five Justices
that support the judgment or resuks5This is an entirely different type of splintered decision than the ones described in Gregg
and Marks. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority,B6 correctly noted that the narrowest grounds rule, as applied in
Gregg and Marks, referred "only to the manner in which one
may discern a single holding of the Court in cases in which no
opinion on the issue in question has garnered the support of a
majoritY."'
In City of Lakewood u. Plain Dealer Publishing Co.,B8 JUStice Breman, writing for a foudustice majority? referred to
the narrowest grounds rule as the Court's "settled jurisprudence."" Justice Brennan used the narrowest grounds rule to
support his contention that the plurality opinion from Kouacs u.
A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attor62.
ney General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
63. Marh, 430 U.S. at 192-93.
64.
474 U.S. 254 (1986).
65. See id. at 270 n.4 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C J . & Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 11.15 (1976)). Justice Powell's
argument was used to question the precedential value of Justice Blackrnun's opinion in Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
,
66. Justice Meshall's opinion in Hillery was joined by Justice B r e ~ a n Justice
Blackmun, Justice Stevens, and in relevant part by Justice White.
Hilley, 474 US. at 261-62 n.4. Justice Marshall makes it clear that the
67.
narrowest grounds rule does not apply to any part of an opinion which is supported by a majority of the Court. Id.
68.
486 U.S. 750 (1988).
69.
Plain Dealer was decided by a 4-3 vote. Justice Brennan's opinion was
joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Scalia. Justice White
wrote a dissenting opinion which was joined by Justice Stevens and Justice
O'Connor. Neither Chief Justice Rehnquist .nor Justice Kennedy took part in the
decision of the case.
70. Plain Dealer, 486 U.S. at 765 n.9. Justice Breman's statement is interesting in light of the fact that he joined the dissent in two previous cases, Gregg and
Marks, articulating the narrowest grounds rule. He did join Justice Marshall's
opinion in Hillery. However, the Hillery majority did not rely on the narrowest
grounds rule; it merely pointed to Justice Powell's misapplication of it.
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Cooper7' was controlling precedent.
Most recently, in Franklin u. L y n a ~ g h , Justice
?~
Stevens,
writing in dissent, used the narrowest grounds rule to give
weight to Justice Burger's opinion in Lockett v. Ohio." He stated that "[allthough only four Members of the Court joined the
entire opinion. . . it has the same precedential value as a
MARSHALL'S vote . . . rested on
Court opinion because JUSTICE
a broader ground than did the plurality'~."~~
Although Justice
Stevens wrote in dissent, his application of the narrowest
grounds rule illustrates the purpose it is intended to serve-to
facilitate the interpretation of a majority judgment supported
by different rationales.
Although the narrowest grounds rule has appeared in the
decisions of five Supreme Court cases, the rule can hardly be
In four of five cases apconsidered "settled j~risprudence."~~
plying the narrowest grounds rule, its discussion has been
relegated to footnotes.76This, by itself, does not imply that the
rule is invalid, but a careful review of the cases suggests that
the narrowest grounds rule has been used as a tool to support
a desired result in a limited number of cases, rather than an as
established rule of case interpretati~n.~~
2. Justification for the narrowest grounds rule
From the plurality opinion in Gregg to the dissent in
Franklin, neither the Court nor any of the Justices has ever
explained why the Court's holding in a splintered decision
should be the "position taken by those Members who concurred
in the judgments on the narrowest grounds."78The proposition
71.
336 US. 77 (1949).
72.
487 U.S. 164 (1988).
73.
438 US. 586 (1978).
74.
FrankZin, 487 U.S. at 191 n.1 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan & Marshall,
JJ., dissenting) (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)).
75.
But cf., Plain Dealer, 486 U.S. at 765 n.9.
76.
See supra notes 58, 63, 65, 67, 70 & 74. Marks is the only case discussing
the narrowest grounds rule in the text of the decision.
77.
No Justice has consistently supported the narrowest grounds rule. See
supm notes 59, 61, 65, 66, 69 & 74. Given that the validity of the narrowest
grounds rule was not the issue before the Court in any of the five cases, the
inconsistent support for the rule is not surprising. However, the fact remains that
Marks is the only decision in which the rule has been used determinatively by a
majority of the Court. The HiZZery majority did correctly interpret the narrowest
grounds rule, but merely to point out why it did not apply in that case.
78.
Marks, 430 U.S. at 193 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15
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has been asserted without explanation. However, it is clear
that two separate arguments favor the use of the narrowest
grounds rule. The first, arising from the "case or controversy"
req~irement,'~
is the policy disfavoring "the formulation of
unnecessarily broad principles and encourag[ing] courts t o confine the scope of decisions t o those issues necessary for resolution of the particular case."80The second is the practical need
for lower federal courts to be able t o determine the meaning of
a Supreme Court decision with some degree of clarity. Thus,
the explanation goes, if a lower court applies the narrowest
grounds rule, it will reach the result most likely to be upheld
by a majority of the Supreme Court.
3. Limitations on the narrowest grounds rule
The narrowest grounds rule is a useful tool for deciphering
the holding of the Court in the limited number of splintered
decisions in which the plurality and concurring opinions have a
"broader/narrower" relationship. However, the rule is not applicable t o many splintered decisions.8' In many splintered decisions, the result is supported by rationales that are "different"
as opposed to "broader/narrower."
For example, in Arnett v. Kennedy," the Court held that a
federal employee, subject t o removal only for cause, was not
deprived of Fifth Amendment due process when not given a full
evidentiary hearing prior to removal.83 The plurality determined that Fifth Amendment due process concerns were not
implicated because the employee's rights were conditioned by
statutory removal procedures." In their concurring opinions,
Justice Powell and Justice White disagreed with the plurality.
They concluded that due process concerns were implicated but
found that the statutory removal procedures did not violate the
employee's due process rights.85The dissent agreed with the

(1979)).
79. U.S. CONST. art 111, 5 2.
80. Novak, supra note 5, at 762.
81. Id. at 767.
82.
416 U S . 134 (1974) (analyzed in Novak, supra note 5, at 767-69).
83.
Id. at 163 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J. & Stewart, J.); id. at 164
(Powell, J. joined by Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 195-97 (White, J., concurring); see also Novak, supra note 5, at 767.
84. Kennedy, 416 U.S. at 163; see Novak, supra note 5, at 767.
85. Kennedy, 416 U.S. at 171, 195-96; see Novak, supra note 5, at 767-68.
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concurrence that due process must be satisfied but determined
that it was not satisfied in this case.86
Obviously, the narrowest grounds rule is not dispositive in
this type of case.87 The Court's result, no due process violation, was supported by three Justices who said due process did
not apply and three Justices who said due process was satisfied. An additional complication is that the dissent must be
taken into account in determining future cases of this nature
because six Justices, those concurring and those dissenting,
determined that due process concerns were r e l e v a d 8
4. Casey's application of the narrowest grounds rule to Webster

According to the Third Circuit, the principal objective of
the narrowest grounds rule "is t o promote predictability in the
law by ensuring lower court adherence to Supreme Court pre~edent."~'
The court articulated its definition of the narrowest
grounds rule as follows: "[wlhere a Justice or Justices concurring in the judgment in [a splintered decision] articulates a
legal standard which, when applied, will necessarily produce
results with which a majority of the Court from that case
would agree, that standard is the law of the
The
86. Kennedy, 416 U.S. at 226-27; see Novak, supra note 5, at 768.
For more examples of cases in which the narrowest grounds rule is not
87.
helpful, see Novak, supra note 5; see also Comment, Supreme Court No-Clear-Majority Decisions: A Study in Stare Decisis, 24 U. CHI. L. REV.99 (1956).
See generally Novak, supra note 5, at 768-69.
88.
89.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir. 1991), cert.
granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3498 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1992) (No. 91-902).
Id. The court explained its definition of the narrowest grounds rule as fol90.
lows:
In a constitutional case where (1) there is a 5-4 decision or where there
are only two opinions in the majority and (2) the majority votes to uphold a law as constitutional, the "narrowest grounds" principle will identify as authoritative the standard articulated by a Justice or Justices that
would uphold the fewest laws as constitutional. Conversely, in a constitutional case where (1) there is a 5-4 split or there are only two opinions
in the majority and (2) the majority strikes down a law as unconstitutional, the authoritative standard will be that which would invalidate the
fewest laws as unconstitutional.
Id. at 693-94 (emphasis added; "or" in the preceding passage was probably meant
to be "and*). In a footnote the court continues its explanation:
When six or more Justices join in the judgment and they issue three
or more opinions, the situation is slightly more complex. In those cases,
the idea is to locate the opinion of the Justice or Justices who concurred
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Third Circuit then determined that because Justice 0'Connor7s
opinions, applying an undue burden analysis, were the narrowest of the concurring opinions in both Webster and Hodgson,
they were binding."
a. Problems with Casey's application of the narrowest
grounds rule. The application of the narrowest grounds rule i n
Casey creates several theoretical difficulties.
1. Justice Scalia's criticism. According to Casey's formulation of the narrowest grounds rule, Justice Scalia's concurring
opinion in Webster is arguably the broadest of the three concurring opinions. Thus, based on a broader/narrower relationship,
Justice O'Connor's opinion, as the narrowest, would be included
within the parameters of Justice Scalia's opinion. However, i n
his opinion, Justice Scalia criticizes Justice 0%onnor7s undue
burden standard, noting that he knows of "no basis for determining that this particular burden (or any other for that matter) is 'due."B2 In light of this criticism, it is diflicult to suggest that Justice Scalia would consider Justice 0%onnor9s "narrower" opinion as fitting within the parameters of his own. To
do so would require the reduction of each opinion to the standard of review it purports to apply while disregarding the remainder of its analysis and commentary.
2. One-Justice majorities. The most obvious theoretical
difficulty with the narrowest grounds rule is that it allows a
single Justice to declare the law, even if the other eight JusticArguably, following the opinion of a single Juses di~agree.'~
on the narrowest grounds necessary to secure a majoriQ. In other words,
a lower court should not follow an opinion that, though part of the majority in that case, was unnecessary to secure a five Justice majority.
Thus, if three Justices issue the broadest opinion, two Justices concur on
narrower grounds, and one Justice concurs on still-narrower grounds, the
two-Justice opinion is binding because that was the narrowest of the
opinions necessary to secure a majority.
Id. at 694 n.7. Although the court states the function of the narrowest grounds
rule is t o promote predictability in the law, id. at 693, its explanation of the narrowest grounds rule appears more supportive of the narrowness objective based on
the case or controversy requirement. See supra text accompanying notes 76-77. In
practice, however, both objectives are achieved.
91.
Casey, 947 F.2d at 697. Although the Casey court correctly applied the narrowest grounds rule to Webster and Hodgson, the court incorrectly applied Justice
0'Connor7s undue burden standard. See supra note 33.
92.
Webster v. Reproductive Health Sews., 492 U.S. 490, 536 n.* (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment).
93.
This fact was not lost to the Casey court. "We acknowledge[] that,
'[allthough there is some awkwardness in attributing precedential value to an
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tice for the sake of predictability in the law is counterproductive in the long run for two reasons. First, a legal principle
supported by a single Justice is not likely to endure very long,
especially in highly controversial areas of the law such as abort i o d 4 Second, uncertainty in the law is increased by discouraging the negotiation and compromise necessary to create a
majority opinion while encouraging splintered decisions with
each Justice expressing an individual view of the applicable
legal principle.g5
3. Narrowest grounds in light of the Court's statements.
Another difficulty with Casey's use of the narrowest grounds
rule is that every Justice in Webster, regardless of the standard
of review he or she applied, noted that Roe is still the law of
the land." To the extent that the Justices have expressly stated that Roe is still the law, it appears problematic to formulate
a rule under the narrowest grounds test which contradicts

opinion of one Supreme Court justice to which no other justice adhered, it is the
usual practice when that is the determinative opinion.' " Casey, 947 F.2d at 694
(quoting Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 888 F.2d 975, 981 (3d Cir. 1989)).
This observation is highly relevant in this case. Since Webster and Hodgson,
94.
Justices Brennan and Marshall have retired from the Court and have been replaced by Justices Souter and Thomas. With these changes, many observers feel
that those Justices who advocated rational basis review of abortion regulations will
attract a majority in Casey. See, e.g., Bruce Fein, Legal Primer for Abortion's
Future, WASH.
TIMES,Jan. 28, 1992, at F1; Nancy E. Roman, Thomas a Zost
Cause' to Pro-choice, WASH.
TIMES,Mar. 11, 1992, at A4. This does not imply that
Supreme Court precedent can be overturned by attrition. The force of precedent
remains in tact regardless of the personnel changes on the Court. However, these
changes do affect the way the Court will decide an issue in the future.
95.
Splintered decisions are not a new phenomenon. See generally John F.
Davis & William L. Reynolds, Juridical Crippks: PluraliQ Opinions in the Supreme
Court, 1974 DUKELJ. 59; Novak supra note 5; Comment, supra note 87; . But
from the standpoint of a lower federal court seeking to apply the Supreme Court's
decisions, splintered decisions should not be encouraged.
96.
Webster, 492 U.S. at 521 (Rebnquist, CJ., joined by White & Kennedy, JJ.)
("This case therefore affords us no occasion to revisit the holding of Roe . . . . To
the extent indicated in our opinion, we would modify and narrow Roe and succeeding cases.") id. at 525 (O'Comor, J.) ("[Tlhere is no necessity to . . . reexamine
the constitutional validity of Roe v. Wade." (citation omitted)); id. at 537 (Scalia, J.)
("Of the four courses we might have chosen today-to reaffirm Roe, to overrule it
explicitly, to overrule it sub si2enti0, or to avoid the question-the last [the one
chosen by the Court] is the least responsible."); id at 537 (Blackmun, J. joined by
Brennan & Marshall, JJ.) ("Today, Roe v. W d , and the fundamental constitutional right of women to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy, survive but are
not secure." (citation omitted)); see id. at 561 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (YTIhere is no need to modifv even slightly the holdings of
prior cases in order to uphold 5 188.029.").

2891

PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. CASEY

305

these statements.
4. The implicit meaning of a splintered decision. The fmal
difEculty with the narrowest grounds approach is that it imputes to those Justices who concur on "broader" grounds an
implicit approval of the reasoning of the narrowest concurrence. The fact that Justices who support a result write separately to express their reasoning suggests that they do not
agree with the reasoning of the other concurring opinions. If
the Justices who concur on "broader" grounds really did agree
with the "narrower" concurrence, they would join it and save
the effort of expressing a "different" view. This objection highlights the fact that the narrowest grounds rule is not, in reality, a tool for discerning an actual constitutional doctrine. Rather, the rule is a tool which enables a lower federal court t o
reach a result that will be upheld upon review by the Supreme
Court.
b. The practical advantage of the narrowest grounds rule.
Despite the theoretical difficulties with the narrowest grounds
rule, its application in Casey is justified &om a practical perspective. The role of a lower federal court in constitutional
adjudication is to decide each case based on guidance given by
the Supreme Court. When the Court's guidance is unclear, the
lower court must predict how the Supreme Court would decide
the case. In Webster and Hodgson four Justices advocated rational basis scrutiny and four Justices advocated strict scrutiny.
In both cases, the outcome of Justice O'Connor's undue burden
analysis provided the swing vote for the majorities' result."
Therefore, from a practical point of view, the Third Circuit was
entirely correct in applying the undue burden analysis because
it was dispositive in both Webster and Hodgson, notwithstanding the Justices' statements concerning the continuing
validity of Roe?'

B. Precedential Value of Old Results in
Light of New Rationale
The decisions of the Supreme Court are the law of the

97.
See supra notes 26-37 and accompanying text.
See supra note 96. What appears t o have occurred in the recent abortion
98.
decisions is a bifurcation of the Court's abortion jurisprudence. Roe continues to
control statutes which prohibit abortion, but not statutes which regulate abortion.
See supra notes 10 & 41 and accompanying text.
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land." To the extent they are applicable, they are binding on
the lower courts until they have been reversed or overruled.lM These principles, though generally accepted, do not
end the inquiry when the continuing validity of a Supreme
Court decision is in doubt. Before a lower federal court can
apply the law as stated by the Supreme Court, it must f i s t
determine what that law is.'" As previously noted, this is not
always an easy task,lo2 especially considering the Supreme
Court's habit of overruling its cases without an express statement.lo3
1. Precedent may be overruled by implication

The rationale or ratio decidendi of a later case may eviscerate the precedentid value of older authority as effectively as a
statement expressly overturning it.'" Often "the overruling
must be deduced from the principles of related cases."105 The
Supreme Court noted over 100 years ago in Asher u. Texas106
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
99.
100. Rodriguez De Quijas v. ShearsodAmerican Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484
(1989) ("If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears
to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals
should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative
of overruling its own decisions."); Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand,
Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535 (1983) (per curiam) ('[O]nly this Court may overrule one of
its precedentsn); see also supra note 4 and accompanying text. Thus, the duty of a
lower federal court is to apply the law as it finds it, not to reshape the law by
overruling precedent. See, e.g., Sojourner v. Roemer, 772 F. Supp. 930, 931-32 (E.D.
La. 1991); K e ~ a r dv. United Parcel Service, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 1139, 1142 (E.D.
Mich. 1982).
101. In situations like this it is "emphatically the province and duty of then
lower federal court to try t o figure out "what the law is." Cf Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
102. See supra part I.
103. See infia note 105 and accompanying text.
104. E.g., Sablan Constr. Co. v. Government of Trust Territory, 526 F. Supp.
135, 142 (D.N. Mariana Islands 1981).
105. CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCHSERVICE, THE C O N ~ O OFN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA,ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION,S. Doc. No. 99-16, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2117 (1988). This report and its 1988 supplement notes 190 instances in
which the Supreme Court has overruled a previous decision. Sixty-three of the 190
reversals (33%) did not explicitly state that they were overruling the previous case.
Id. 2117-2'7; CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH
SERVICE,THE C O N S T ~ I OOF
NTHE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA,ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION,
S. DOC.NO. 100-43, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 207-08 (1988 Supp.).
106.
128 U.S. 129 (1888). In Asher, the Court found that the law and the facts
were indistinguishable from those considered in a previous case, Robbins v. Shelby
County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S.489 (1887). The petitioner contended that the deci-
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that it may overrule its precedent by implication.
[We had supposed that a later decision in conflict with prior
ones had the effect to overrule [the previous ones], whether
mentioned and commented on or not. And as to the constitutional principles involved, our views were quite fully and
carefully, if not clearly and satisfactorily expressed in the
[later case].'ol

More recently, in Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts
Co.,'08 Justice Douglas, writing for a unanimous Court, referred to Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania,'" a case undermined by subsequent opinion^,"^ as "only a relic of a bygone era* and refused to follow its precedent.'"
Another recent example of a silent or implicit reversal is
Employment Diu ision, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith.'12 In Smith, the Court applied rational basis scrutiny
in place of the previous standard-strict scrutiny-and deter~ not protect relimined that the Free Exercise C l a u ~ e "did
giously inspired use of peyote from state criminal sanctions.'" As the dissent noted, "In short, it effectuates a wholesale overturning of settled law concerning the Religion Clauses of our Con~titution.""~Although the majority did not expressly state that it was overruling the Court's previous Free
sion in Robbins was "contrary to sound principles of constitutional construction,
and in conflict with well adjudicated cases formerly decided by this court and not
overruled." Asher, 128 U.S. at 131.
107. Asher, 128 U.S. at 131-32. Accord Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 517-20
(1976) (holding that Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), implicitly overruled Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308 (1968)).
108.
410 U.S. 356 (1973).
109.
277 U.S. 389 (1928).
110. Lehnhuusen, 410 U.S. at 362. According to Justice Douglas, the cases which
undermine &uak.er City Cab include Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940);
Nashville, C. & St. L. R.Co. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940); New York Rapid
Transit Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U.S. 573 (1938); Carmichael v. Southern
Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937); White River Lumber Co. v. Arkansas, 279
U.S. 692 (1929).
111. Lehnhausen, 410 U.S. at 365. While it is true that Quaker City Cab was
decided in 1928, some 45 years before Lehnhausen, the fad remains that Quaker
City Cab was never expressly overruled. The Court disregarded the case because

its vitality had been undermined by subsequent decisions.
494 U S 872 (1990).
U.S. CONSF.amend. I.
Smith,494 U.S. at 878-80.
Id. at 908 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).

112.
113.
114.
115.
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Exercise Clause decisions, its refusal to apply strict scrutiny
rendered these previous decisions impotent.'16 In similar
fashion, the Webster and Hodgson majorities' refusal to apply
strict scrutiny undermines part of the precedentid value of
Roe.''
2. Lower federal courts are not required to follow precedent
which has been implicitly overruled

When the Supreme Court adopts a new rule or test for
deciding a case, that rule or test is binding on the lower
courts.118The Third Circuit extended this principle in Casey,
determining that not only is a new test binding, but if the new
test will not support the holding or result of a previous case,
the previous result is no longer the law.'lg This conclusion is
not necessarily erroneous considering the importance American
jurisprudence places on "rule stare decisi~"'~~-theconsistent
application of legal rules or tests developed in prior cases.
a. Living v. dead law. In Norris u. United States,lzl
Judge Posner commented that

116. Lower federal courts now follow the precedent of Smith. See, e.g., Vandiver
v. Hardin County Bd. of Educ., 925 F.2d 927, 931-34 (6th Cir. 1991); Yang v.
Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558 (1990).
117. But see United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 436 (1922) ("a case is not
overruled by an omission to mention it"). The Court's statement, though facially
inconsistent with the concept of implicit reversal, is not dispositive of the issue in
Casey. In Moreland, the Court merely noted that the failure to cite a previous case
did not affect the validity of its precedent. It did not address the effect subsequent
analysis might have on the vitality of a precedent or the effect of specifically considering a case and not applying its analysis.
118. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 194 (1977); cfi County of Alle, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
gheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 668 (1989) ( K e ~ e d y J.
White & Scalia, JJ., dissenting) (cited in P l a ~ e dParenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d
682, 692 (3d Cir. 1991) ("As a general rule, the principle of stare decisis directs us
to adhere not only to the holdings of our prior cases, but also to their explications
of the governing rules of law.")).
119. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. In holding that the result of
the older case is no longer binding, the Casey court did not mean that the result
is wrong, rather the court reasoned that if the application of a new standard of
review leads to a different result, the result of the old case ceases to control. See
Casey, 947 F.2d at 698 n.12.
120. Novak, supra note 5, at 757-58 and m.7-10. Rule stare decisis requires the
adherence "to the general rule of law promulgated by a prior court in support of
its judgment." Id. at 758 n.10. Arguably, result stare decisis allows a court to
"adopt a new justifying rule so long as the result reached is consistent with the
result in the earlier case." Id.
121. 687 F.2d 899 (7th Cir. 1982).
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[c]onstitutional law is very largely a prediction of how the
Supreme Court will decide particular issues when presented
to it for decision. . . . [Slometimes later decisions, though not
explicitly overruling or even mentioning an earlier decision,
indicate that the Court very probably will not decide the issue
the same way the next time. In such a case, to continue to
follow the earlier case blindly until it is formally overruled is
to apply the dead, not the living, law.ln

The Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in
Vukasovich, Inc. v. Commissioner,'" stating:
[Tlhe Supreme Court has long held that "a later decision in
conflict with prior ones @as] the effect to overrule them,
whether mentioned and commented on or not." . . . Following
an obviously outdated Supreme Court decision gives effect to
an old decision only at the cost of ignoring more recent decisions. It forces the Supreme Court to reverse lower court
decisions following the older law, burdening both the Supreme
Court and litigants. It also deprives the Supreme Court of the
benefit of a contemporary decision on the merits by the Court
of Appeals.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that "the courts of appeal should
decide cases according t o their reasoned view of the way [the]
Supreme Court would decide the pending case today."'25
b. Detecting an implicit reversal. In United States v.
~ u r k e , 'Judge
~
Easterbrook noted that "[a district] court
need not blindly follow decisions that have been undercut by
subsequent cases" if it has "an adequate basis for believing that
this court would no longer follow [its pre~edent]."~~'
Although

122. Id. at 904. In Norris, the Seventh Circuit upheld a district court ruling that
failure to raise a constitutional issue on a direct appeal barred its use in a section
2255 motion despite the Supreme Court's ruling in Kaufman v. United States, 394
U.S. 217 (1969) ("failure to raise a constitutional issue on direct appeal does not
prevent raising it later in a section 2255 motion unless the movant was deliberately bypassing the appellate process."). The Seventh Circuit noted that in light of
subsequent Supreme Court opinions, Kaufman was no longer binding precedent
even though it had not been expressly overturned. Norris, 687 F.2d a t 903-04.
123. 790 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1986).
124. Id. at 1416 (citations omitted).
125. Id.
126. 781 F.2d 1234 (7th Cir. 1985).
127. Id. at 1239 n.2. Judge Easterbrook's comment was prompted by a district
court's decision not to give the "standing alone" instruction required by United
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Burke dealt with a precedent established by the Seventh Circuit, it is instructive in the context of Supreme Court precedent
as well. If a lower federal court has an adequate basis for believing that the Supreme Court will no longer follow an outdated precedent, the lower federal court may be justified in disregarding that precedent. However, in order to avoid chaos in the
federal judicial system, an adequate basis must include, at a
minimum, evidence that the precedential value of an older decision has been seriously undermined. This standard for evaluating the validity of an older decision was endorsed by the
Supreme Court in Limbach u. Hooven & Allison Co.'" The
Court stated that "[allthough Hooven I was not expressly overruled in Michelin, it must be regarded as retaining no vitality
since the Michelin decision. The conclusion of the Supreme
Court of Ohio that Hooven I retains current validity in this respect is therefore in error."129
In light of the Supreme Court's analysis in Webster and
Hodgson, the Third Circuit was justified in asserting an adequate basis for believing that the Supreme Court would not
follow the precedent of Roe, Akron I, or Thornburgh.

The narrowest grounds rule suffers from significant theoretical inconsistencies. However, from a practical standpoint, it
is a useful tool for lower federal courts to use in interpreting
the precedential value of Supreme Court splintered decisions.
Given the voting patterns of the Justices in Webster and
Hodgson, the Casey court properly applied the narrowest
grounds rule, resulting in a+findingthat undue burden review
is the appropriate standard for reviewing abortion regulations.
The Casey court's decision to discard the holdings in Akron I
and Thornburgh is facially troubling because the Supreme
Court has not expressly repudiated them. However, the Court
has arguably changed its standard of review for abortion regulations to undue burden review. Therefore, the Third Circuit
appropriately discarded a result which, according to the court's

States v. D o ~ e l l y ,179 F.2d 227, 233 (7th Cir. 1950). Judge Easterbrook noted
that "recent decisions . . . [had] distinguished Donnelly on such thin grounds as to
undermine its foundations."Burke, 781 F.2d at 1239 n.2.
128.
466 U.S. 353, 357-61 (1984).
Id. at 361 (referring to Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976)).
129.
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analysis, would not be supported by that standard.
Although these issues arose in the abortion context, they
are applicable to other substantive areas of the law as well. At
a time when the Supreme Court is modifymg many of its previous precedents and issuing splintered decisions, lower federal
courts will need to make use of tools such as rule stare decisis
and the narrowest grounds rule to reach a decision which reasonably predicts how the Court would decide the case. If the
Supreme Court objects to this type of jurisprudence, the Court
has, indeed always has had, the mechanism to prevent it. The
Justices of the Supreme Court can clearly state "what the law
is."
William G. Peterson

